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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN RE FASTENERS ANTITRUST
MDL Docket No. 1912
LITIGATION :
___________________________________ :
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
____________________________________:

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF CO-LEAD COUNSEL’S JOINT PETITION
FOR AWARD OF COUNSEL FEES, PAYMENT OF COSTS AND EXPENSES,
AND AWARD OF INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES
CO-LEAD COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT………………………………………………………….1 BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………………2 APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD IN COMMON FUND CASES………………….6 CO-LEAD COUNSEL SHOULD BE AWARDED THE REQUESTED FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES……………………………………7 The Request for Counsel Fees Falls Well Within The Range of Approval……….8 Size of the Fund Created and Number of Persons Benefited……………. 9 Absence of Objections…………………………………………………….9 Skill and Efficiency of Attorneys Involved…………………………….10 Complexity and Duration of the Litigation………………………………12 The Risk of Nonpayment……………………………………………….15 Amount of Time Devoted to the Case………………………………….16 Awards in Similar Cases…………………………………………………17 The Value of Benefits Attributable to Plaintiffs’ Counsel………………18 Private Contingency Fee Arrangement………………………………….19 Innovative Terms of Settlement…………………………………………19 A Lodestar Cross-Check Demonstrates That The Fee Is Reasonable………….20 The Request For An Award Of Expenses Incurred Is Reasonable………………21 INCENTIVE AWARDS FOR THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES ARE APPROPRIATE…………………………………………………………………………22 CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………23 TABLE OF CASES
255 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Pa. 2009)………………………………………………………………10 465 U.S. 866 (1984) ………………………………………………………………………….6 444 U.S. 472 (1980) ………………………………………………………………………….6 Bradburn Parent Teacher Store, Inc. v. 3M, 513 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Pa. 2007)…………………………………………………………17 Caracallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207 (D.N.J. 2005) ……………………………………………………………….20 197 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ………………………………………………………….11, 18 No. 01-CV-6539, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23976 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2004)………………….17 Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000)…………………………………………………………………7, 8 MDL No. 1219, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2001)…………………………21 In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2006) ………………………………………………………….7, 10, 20 In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004)………….15, 17, 20 In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008) …………………passim In re Baby Products Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013)………………………………………………………………….8 264 F. 3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) ……………………………………………………………….7 In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001)…………………………………………………………………7 293 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Pa. 2003)……………………………………………………17, 22 In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2009)……………………………………………………………passim Nos. 03-942 & 03-6596, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16577 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2005) ……….17 In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2008) ………………………………………………………3 In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1912, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90076 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011) ……………passim In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1912, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110513 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2012)………………5, 13 No. 08-cv-3149 (Direct Purchasers), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2013) ………………………………passim In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ………………………………………………………18 In re Greenwich Pharm. Sec. Lit., No. 92-3071, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5717 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1995) …………………….18 In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ……………………………………………………10, 19, 22 In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92 (D.N.J. 2012) ………………………………………………………………19 In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10532 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004) ………11, 12, 17, 20 In re Merck & Co. Vytorin ERISA Litig., No. 08-285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2010) …………………….….19 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2000) …………………………………………………….12 In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160764 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012) …………………8 In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) ……………………………………………………………7, 8, 17 In re Ravisent Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 00-1014, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2005) ……………….17, 20 In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, No. 03-0085, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005) ………………………19 305 F. Supp. 2d 491 (W.D. Pa. 2003) ………………………………………………….15, 20 In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005) …………………………………………………….7, 10, 15, 20 No. 99-5333, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20160 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2001) ……………………22 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231 (D. Del. 2002) ……………………………………………………………13 In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004) ………………………………………………………………17 95 F. Supp. 2d 290 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ………………………………………………………16 McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 329 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ………………………………………………………19 No. 04-5871, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56744 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006) ……………….20, 21 No. 08-773, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6929 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011)…………………………9 Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. No. 00-6222, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7061 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2005) …………….10, 20, 21 Serrano v. Sterling Testing Sys., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ……………………………………………………….10 Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) …………………………………………………………….7, 22 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., Barrack, Rodos & Bacine, Law Offices Bernard M. Gross, P.C., and Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer, L.L.P. (hereinafter, “Co-Lead Counsel”1), respectfully submit this request for an award of attorneys’ fees and payment of litigation costs and expenses incurred during this litigation. 2 Co-Lead Counsel also request that the Court approve an additional award of incentive payments to the Class Representatives in recognition of their continued service during this litigation on behalf of the Class. Plaintiffs’ Counsel have vigorously litigated this action during the past six years, resulting in settlements with three groups of defendants, William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Consumer USA, Inc., Prym Fashion, Inc., Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Consumer GmbH, EP Group S.A., Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Fashion GmbH, Prym Consumer Europe GmbH, and William Prym Inc. (collectively, “Prym”), YKK Corporation, YKK Corporation of America, YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., and YKK Snap Fasteners America Inc., n/k/a LBK Real Estate Corporation (collectively, “YKK”), and Coats Holdings, Ltd., Coats Holdings, Inc., Coats American, Inc., d.b.a. Coats North America, Coats North America de Republica Dominicana, Inc., and Coats & Clark, Inc. (collectively, “Coats”),3 totaling $17.55 million on Co-Lead Counsel’s fee application requests $5.85 million in attorneys’ fees, one-third of the Settlement Fund, which is approximately 0.68% of all counsel’s cumulative lodestar,                                                             1 Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, ¶6, the Court appointed these firms to serve as Co-Lead Counsel for the Class. ECF No. 126. 2 Exhibit B to the Declaration of Warren Rubin (“Rubin Decl.”), filed in further support of this motion, lists the 48 plaintiffs’ firms involved in this litigation since inception, and reflects each firm’s hours, lodestar, and expenses. 3 While this action was pending, Defendant Scovill filed a bankruptcy petition on April 19, 2011, (ECF No. 91) and was voluntarily dismissed from this action on July 30, 2013 (ECF No. 123). resulting in a “negative” multiplier. As set forth in more detail herein, the instant fee request is reasonable pursuant to Third Circuit standards. Co-Lead Counsel also request that the Court approve payment from the settlement proceeds of $337,667.72 in litigation costs and expenses incurred in the prosecution of this action, and additional $5,000 incentive payments to each of the Class Representatives Fishman & Tobin, Inc., Greco Apparel, Inc., Jolna Apparel Group LLC, and Norman Shatz Co, U.S.A., in recognition of their time, effort, and risk. The requested litigation costs and expenses were incurred in the prosecution of this case and are reasonable. Moreover, the requested incentive awards to the four Class Representatives are appropriate in light of their assistance in achieving the successful resolution of this litigation. Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request the Court to enter an order awarding the requested counsel fees and expenses, and approving additional incentive payments to each of the Class BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an alleged conspiracy to fix prices and allocate customers for “Fasteners” 4 used primarily in the textile, apparel, footwear, and luggage industries. On September 19, 2007, the European Commission (“EC”) issued a press release announcing the imposition of fines on several companies, including defendants herein, for operating cartels in the European and worldwide fasteners markets. Approximately six weeks later, on October 31, 2007, the first of multiple class actions on behalf of United States purchasers of Fasteners was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See Goodwill                                                             4 For purposes of this litigation, “Fasteners” includes zippers, snap fasteners, jeans buttons, hooks and eyes, clamping locks, clip fasteners and rivets, whether made of metal or plastic. Fasteners are used for fastening materials together in products used primarily in the textile, apparel, footwear and luggage industries. Industries of South Florida, Inc. v. William Prym GmbH & Co., KG, et al., C.A. No. 1:07-9691 On February 27, 2008, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL Panel”), after considering competing motions for pretrial coordination in either this District or in the Southern District of New York, entered a transfer order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 designating this Court as the transferee district for In re Fasteners Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1912. In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2008). Thirty-five (35) cases alleging price-fixing conspiracies in the United States Fasteners market were eventually consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for pre-trial purposes pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). CTO-1 (ECF No. 3) and CTO-2 (ECF No. 17). After the MDL Panel issued its transfer order, a meeting was held on March 4, 2008 in an effort to reach agreement on an organizational structure of plaintiffs’ counsel that could be submitted for this Court’s approval. These efforts were not entirely successful. During several subsequent telephone calls and a meeting in Philadelphia on May 19, 2008, counsel attempted, without success, to resolve the outstanding issues relating to the organization of plaintiffs’ counsel. Shortly thereafter, the undersigned Counsel filed a motion seeking appointment as co- lead counsel with responsibility for the prosecution of claims based on United States law, whereas two other firms would have responsibility for non-United States law claims. On August 20, 2009, the Court issued Case Management Order (“CMO”) No. 1 (ECF No. 54), in which it coordinated all related actions pending before it, and appointed Interim Co- Lead Class Counsel5 to prosecute all claims under United States law. Since that point in time,                                                             5 This Court appointed Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., Barrack, Rodos & Bacine, Law Offices Bernard M. Gross, P.C., and Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer, L.L.P., as “Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel” charged with “coordinating and organizing the plaintiffs in the conduct of this litigation as to all claims under United States law.” See CMO No. 1 at Co-Lead Counsel have successfully directed the prosecution of this litigation with the assistance Approximately two and one-half years after the first action was filed, Plaintiffs reached a settlement with Prym, which was memorialized in an agreement dated March 2, 2010. (ECF No. 56). This initial settlement followed months of intensive negotiations that took place via correspondence, telephone and in-person meetings. Under the terms of this settlement, Prym agreed to pay $1.1 million and to assist plaintiffs in the prosecution of their claims against the remaining defendants. Pursuant to this cooperation provision, Prym provided plaintiffs with extensive information about the alleged conspiracy by producing relevant documents and via interviews with counsel and Prym personnel. Utilizing this information, and other information gathered independently, on May 24, 2010, Fishman & Tobin, Greco Apparel, Inc., Jolna Apparel Group LLC, and Norman Shatz Co., U.S.A. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) (ECF No. 61) asserting that defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices and allocate customers and markets in the United States for Fasteners. Plaintiffs contended that as a result of the conspiracy, they and other members of the Class paid artificially inflated prices for Fasteners and, as a result, suffered antitrust injury to their business and property. Plaintiffs sought treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs from On July 23, 2010, defendants filed several motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 70) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (ECF No. 71 and 73). On August 12, 2011, the Court denied defendants’ joint Rule 12(b)(6) motion and YKK’s Rule                                                                                                                                                                                                 ¶13. Non-United States law claims were voluntarily dismissed (ECF Nos. 59 & 60); therefore only the United States law claims remain in the case. 12(b)(2) motion, and permitted plaintiffs to take jurisdictional discovery with respect to Coats’ Rule 12(b)(2) motion. In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1912, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90076 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011). (ECF Nos. 92, 93). On August 30, 2011, defendants filed a motion seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as to the Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to defeat defendants’ motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. (ECF No. 94). Defendants’ motion was denied on August 6, 2012. In re Fasteners Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1912, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110513 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2012). (ECF Nos. 118, 119). On August 26, 2011, plaintiffs propounded jurisdictional discovery on Coats plc. Coats plc responded to plaintiffs’ requests on September 26, 2011, and thereafter the parties engaged in several months of negotiations. Ultimately, after Plaintiffs’ Counsel had reviewed the documents produced by Coats plc and was preparing to travel to London to depose Coats plc’s affiant, an agreement was reached in a stipulation and Order dated December 11, 2011, that Coats Holdings Ltd. would be substituted as a defendant in lieu of Coats plc. (ECF No. 110). On February 9, 2012, plaintiffs served their first set of discovery requests on all defendants. Defendants served their first set of document requests upon plaintiffs on August 31, 2012. Co-Lead Counsel engaged in multiple meet-and-confer sessions with defense counsel regarding these discovery requests, and a Joint Rule 26(f) Report. These sessions took place Co-Lead Counsel also engaged in settlement negotiations with YKK and Coats during the course of this litigation. Negotiations with YKK took place by correspondence, telephone and an in-person meeting, all of which resulted in a settlement that was memorialized in an agreement dated May 20, 2013. (ECF No. 124-3). Negotiations with Coats also took place by correspondence, telephone and an in-person meeting, all of which culminated in a settlement agreement dated July 29, 2013. (ECF No. 124-4, 124-5). Both settlements, along with the earlier Settlement with Prym, were preliminarily approved by the Court and notice to the Class was authorized on August 27, 2013. (ECF No. 126). In the Notice, the Class was informed that Co-Lead Counsel intended to apply to this Court for an award of attorneys’ fees not to exceed 33 1/3% of the $17.55 million Settlement Fund, payment of litigation costs and expenses, and payment of incentive awards. The Notice, which was mailed to potential Class members on October 25, 2013, also advised that the final date for filing objections or requesting exclusion from the Class is December 15, 2013. To date, there have been no objections to the proposed settlements or requests for exclusion.6 In compensation for their time and risk in prosecuting the litigation on a wholly- contingent fee basis, Co-Lead Counsel now apply to the Court for an award of counsel fees in an amount of $5.85 million. Co-Lead Counsel also seek payment from the Settlement Fund of $337,667.72 in litigation costs and expenses, as well as payment of incentive awards to the four Class Representatives in the amount of $5,000.00 each. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD IN COMMON FUND CASES
"In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Counsel who recover a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client are entitled to a reasonable counsel fee from the fund as a whole. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 866, 900 n.16 (1984).                                                             6Co-Lead Counsel will report objections or opt-out requests, if any, to the Court after the December 15, 2013 deadline. In the Third Circuit, “the percentage of recovery method is 'generally favored' in cases involving a common settlement fund[.]" In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008) (quoting In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 732 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Cendant PRIDES”) citing Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Gunter”)). This method “allows courts to award fees from the fund in a manner that rewards counsel for success and penalizes it for failure." Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc. 667 F.3d 273, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (En Banc) ("Sullivan''); In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Rite Aid”) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998)). While the Third Circuit has repeatedly "recommended" that a percentage-of-recovery award be "cross-checked" against the lodestar method to ensure its reasonableness, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F. 3d 201, 286 (3d Cir. 2001), "[t]he lodestar cross-check, while useful, should not displace a district court's primary reliance on the percentage-of-recovery method." In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) ("AT&T”). CO-LEAD COUNSEL SHOULD BE AWARDED THE REQUESTED FEES AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
Since 2007, during which time Plaintiffs’ Counsel have vigorously prosecuted this action, they have not received any fees for their work, while they have at the same time incurred significant out-of-pocket expenses. Co-Lead Counsel informed the Class in the long-form Notice that it would ask the Court to award attorneys' fees that “will not exceed 33 1/3 percent of the Settlement Fund.” Preliminary Approval Order, Exhibit A (ECF No. 124-8). Co-Lead Counsel now seek fees equal to one-third of the Settlement Fund. This percentage is a reasonable and typical portion of a settlement to be awarded as fees in comparable actions, and falls well within the range of approval in the Third Circuit. See In re Automotive Refinishing Paint, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *16 (granting plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for fees equaling one-third of the settlement fund and noting that “it is not unusual in antitrust class actions for attorneys to receive awards for fees in the 30% range.”).7 Hence, Co-Lead Counsel respectfully submit that the requested fees and expenses are appropriate, given the nature and extent of Counsel’s efforts in creating settlements beneficial to the Class as well as the risks assumed in prosecuting this complex antitrust matter with no The Request for Counsel Fees Falls Well Within The Range of Approval
The Third Circuit has held that district courts "must consider" ten factors "[i]n determining what constitutes a reasonable percentage fee award[.]" In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009). These factors include: (1) the size of the fund created and the number of beneficiaries; (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel; (7) the awards in similar cases; (8) the value of benefits attributable to the efforts of class counsel relative to the efforts of other groups, such as government agencies conducting investigations; (9) the percentage fee that would have been negotiated had the case been subject to a private contingent fee arrangement at the time counsel was retained; and (10) any innovative terms of settlement. Id. (citing Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1 (“the Gunter factors”), and In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1998) (“the Prudential factors”). See also In re Baby Products Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that Gunter/Prudential factors “aid courts in evaluating the reasonableness of percentage fee awards.”); In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002, 2012                                                             7 See, infra, additional supporting case law discussed under the “Awards in Similar Cases” section. U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160764, at *6-*7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012) (adopting 10-factor fee application These factors, however, should not "be applied in a rigid, formulaic manner, but rather a court must weigh them in light of the facts and circumstances of each case." Moore v. Comcast Corp., No. 08-773, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6929, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011). Co-Lead Counsel respectfully submit that the application of these factors supports the fee of $5.85 million Size of the Fund Created and Number of Persons Benefited
Here, through the efforts of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, $17.55 million has been obtained for members of the proposed Settlement Class. Over 32,000 court-approved Notices and Proof of Claim forms were mailed to potential Class members nationwide. Without the efforts of Plaintiffs’ Counsel litigating on their behalf, these Class members may well have seen no recovery at all. As set forth in this brief and other memoranda filed in support of final approval of the Settlement, the cumulative settlements provide an excellent recovery for direct purchasers of Fasteners, particularly in light of the complexity, duration, and expense of ongoing litigation and the risk of establishing liability and damages. Absence of Objections
In connection with fee requests, Courts consider the amount and nature of any objections. As of the filing of this motion, no Class member has objected to either the Settlement or Co-Lead Counsel’s intent to apply for fees, expenses or incentive awards to the Class Representatives.8 This factor firmly counsels in favor of the award sought here. See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541-42 (affirming district court’s conclusion that “few objections to the settlement terms and to the fees requested by counsel” counseled in favor of approval of fees sought by plaintiffs’                                                              8 As noted above, Co-Lead Counsel will update the Court as to any objection prior to the Settlement Hearing.   counsel); AT&T, 455 F.3d at 170 (affirming district court’s conclusion that “the absence of substantial objections by class members to the fees requested by counsel strongly supports approval,” where eight potential class members objected); Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 305 (holding that “[t]he class’s reaction to the fee request supports approval of the requested fees,” where two class members objected out of 300,000 class members); Serrano v. Sterling Testing Sys., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 402, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (the fact that there had “been no objections to the settlement or to the attorneys’ fees request” supported approval of 35% fee and expense award (citing Barel v. Bank of America, 255 F.R.D. 393, 404 (E.D. Pa. 2009)). Skill and Efficiency of Attorneys Involved
The skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved is “measured by the quality of the result achieved, the difficulties faced, the speed and efficiency of the recovery, the standing, experience and expertise of the counsel, the skill and professionalism with which counsel prosecuted the case and the performance and quality of opposing counsel.” Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp,. No. 00-6222, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7061, at *71 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2005) (quoting In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 194 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). The detailed description of the litigation herein illustrates the abundant skill and efficiency of Co-Lead Counsel which underscores Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s experience in litigating complex class actions and antitrust cases in particular. Among other things, Co-Lead Counsel have: (1) drafted the Complaint with attendant factual research; (2) identified and interviewed potential witnesses; (3) sought and received discovery from defendant Prym pursuant to the cooperation provisions of its settlement agreement; (4) served interrogatories and document requests on defendants; (5) responded to defendants’ discovery requests; (6) conducted “meet- and-confer” negotiations and exchanged detailed correspondence with defendants regarding the preparation of a Joint Rule 26(f) Report and the adequacy of discovery responses; (7) interviewed experts with respect to defendants’ liability and damages; (8) consulted with computer experts regarding the production and management of computerized data; (9) thoroughly researched the law pertinent to the claims and defenses asserted; (10) analyzed documents produced by the defendants; (11) prepared motions and briefs related to specific legal issues; (12) negotiated and drafted stipulations with defendants; and (13) negotiated settlements with Prym, YKK and Coats. Co-Lead Counsel also remain actively involved in supervising the claims administration process, and in taking steps necessary to obtain final approval of the Furthermore, the “very successful settlement negotiations, demonstrates the significant skill and expertise of counsel.” In re Automotive Refinishing Paint, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *13. Here, the recovery is $17.55 million. See Cullen v. Whitman Med. Corp., 197 F.R.D. 136, 149 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“The single clearest factor reflecting the quality of class counsel’s services to the class are the results obtained.”); see also In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10532, at *19 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004). The benefit conferred on the Settlement Class is the result of the skill and efficiency of Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Without their efforts, the Class members that will benefit from this Settlement may never have seen any recovery for what Plaintiffs allege was a nationwide price-fixing conspiracy causing damages to Fasteners purchasers. This is an impressive result, particularly in a case involving a Eurocentric conspiracy and no parallel action by the U.S. Department of Justice. For their part, the Defendants have been well represented by preeminent defense counsel from large, national law firms such as Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Buchanan Ingersoll Rooney, PC, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, all with decades of experience litigating antitrust actions. This factor clearly weighs in favor of the Complexity and Duration of the Litigation
“This litigation, like most antitrust cases, has been exceedingly complex, expensive, and lengthy.” In re Automotive Refinishing Paint, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *14. As is evident from Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s efforts over the last six years, this case has involved a large expenditure of time and effort. As to the complexity of the case, “[a]n antitrust class action is arguably the most complex action to prosecute. . . . The legal and factual issues involved are always numerous and uncertain in outcome.” In re Linerboard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10532, at *34 (quoting In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2000)). This case presents no exception. First, the motions to dismiss the Complaint were complex and extensively briefed. In their joint 12(b)(6) motion, defendants argued, in part, that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b. Plaintiffs, in turn, argued that their antitrust claims were timely because the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolled the limitations period. In denying defendants’ joint motion and sustaining the Complaint, the Court specifically dismissed defendants’ statute of limitations argument, holding that the Complaint adequately stated a claim for fraudulent concealment for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations by alleging that Defendants' conspiracy was self-concealing. In re Fasteners, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90076, at *15. Although the Court acknowledged in its analysis that three different standards can be applied to determine whether the “affirmative act” element of a fraudulent concealment claim is satisfied (the strict standard, the intermediate standard or the more lenient, self-concealing standard), the District Court followed the more lenient standard applied by the majority of district courts in the Third Circuit, thereby holding that Plaintiffs satisfied their pleading burden. Id., at *13. The Court noted, however, that under the strict or intermediate standards, Plaintiffs’ allegations would be insufficient. Id., at *11-*12. Defendants tried to take this issue to the Third Circuit, immediately challenging the more lenient “self-concealing” standard applied by the Court. Defendants filed a Section 1292(b) motion to certify for immediate interlocutory appeal the Court’s Order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 94). Had the District Court certified the question and the Third Circuit, on appeal, adopted the intermediate or strict standard in its fraudulent concealment analysis, as argued by defendants, it is quite possible that the District Court’s holding applying the self-concealing standard would be reversed and the Complaint dismissed. However, Plaintiffs strongly opposed interlocutory review and the Court subsequently denied defendants’ 1292(b) motion. See In re Fasteners, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110513. Given defendants’ tenacity, Plaintiffs could expect these arguments to be raised at both the summary judgment phase and the trial phase of this litigation. Second, in their joint 12(b)(6) motion, defendants also argued that Plaintiffs failed to allege any “plausible product market.” The Court dismissed this argument as well, finding that on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs were “not required to spell out the precise boundaries of the Fasteners product market prior to discovery.” In re Fasteners, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90076, at *26. Defendants, however, would likely challenge Plaintiffs’ definition of the Fasteners product market and oppose any motion for class certification filed by Plaintiffs. Here, as with similar cases, the risk of failing to certify the class was very real. See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 256 (D. Del. 2002) (holding that "the difficulty of obtaining class certification" was a factor in approving settlement). Fortunately, due to their skill and expertise, Co-Lead Counsel were able to settle this matter prior to the class certification motion, resulting in tremendous savings to the Class, as well as the valuable resources of the Court. Third, two foreign defendants, Coats plc and YKK Corporation, each separately moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them under Rule 12(b)(2) by challenging the Court’s personal jurisdiction. The Court denied YKK Corporation's motion, but deferred ruling on Coats plc’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In re Fasteners, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90076, at *49. Through extensive briefing, Plaintiffs and Coats plc disputed the complex genesis of the foreign named defendant Coats plc. Upon learning that Coats plc was taking the position that Plaintiffs had sued the wrong party, Plaintiffs requested that the Court permit limited jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 87, Pls.' Sur-Reply). Deferring its decision on Coats plc’s motion, the Court ordered that Plaintiffs conduct jurisdictional discovery to determine whether Defendant Coats plc had sufficient contacts with the United States to confer personal jurisdiction. In re Fasteners, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90076, at *50. The Court also permitted Plaintiffs to take limited discovery to identify other proper Coats entities as defendants. Id. Pursuant to the Court’s directive, Co-Lead Counsel immediately drafted and propounded jurisdictional discovery on Coats plc. Coats plc was also noticed for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, whereby Co-Lead Counsel prepared and made all necessary arrangements to travel to England to take the affiant’s deposition. Coats plc responded to the discovery and eventually produced documents which were reviewed and analyzed by Co-Lead Counsel. After lengthy negotiations, in December 2011, Coats plc and Plaintiffs stipulated to substitute Coats Holdings Ltd. in lieu of Coats plc in all pleadings and tolling the jurisdictional issue. (ECF No. 110). Hence, the Court never ruled on Coats plc’s motion challenging personal jurisdiction. Settlement at this juncture avoids the parties engaging in protracted and expensive discovery on the merits as well as class certification, both of which also require expert testimony. If Plaintiffs’ claims survived summary judgment and Plaintiffs established liability and damages at trial, ultimately obtaining a favorable verdict, lengthy appeals would likely follow. Hence, this factor strongly supports the fee requested. The Risk of Nonpayment
Plaintiffs’ Counsel undertook this action on a wholly contingent basis, investing a significant amount of time while facing “a risk of nonpayment in the event of an unsuccessful trial.” In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., No. 08-cv-3149 (Direct Purchasers), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *22 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2013). In Rite Aid, the Third Circuit made clear the risk of non-payment includes the "risk of establishing liability." 396 F. 3d at 304 (finding that the “risks of establishing liability” analysis relevant to the assessment of the risk of non-recovery). Plaintiffs’ Counsel also undertook this action without the benefit of the results of any corresponding U.S. governmental investigation, or the cooperation of any amnesty applicants under the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004. See, e.g., In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004) (finding factor favored supporting reasonableness of fee request and agreeing that “lack of government prosecution certainly increased the risk of nonpayment.”). Additionally, counsel have advanced expenses over the past six years, which would not have been reimbursed absent a successful result. See In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 491, 516 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“Aside from investing their time, counsel had to front copious sums of money . . . Thus, the risks that counsel incurred in prosecuting this case were substantial and further support the requested fee award.”). Plaintiffs’ Counsel have $337,667.72 in unreimbursed expenses. See Rubin Decl., Exhibit B. Based on the foregoing, this factor supports approval of the requested fee. Amount of Time Devoted to the Case
As noted in the Declaration of Warren Rubin, Esquire, the aggregate lodestar of all counsel is $8,540,668.80. Rubin Decl., Exhibit B. Summarized in Exhibit B to the Rubin Declaration, are the hours, lodestar and expenses reported to Co-Lead by other Plaintiffs’ firms involved in this litigation. Id.9 Exhibit B also demonstrates that all Plaintiffs’ Counsel have incurred expenses in the aggregate amount of $337,667.72.10 Id. The fact that Plaintiffs’ Counsel could have spent these attorney hours, and these out-of- pocket expenditures, litigating other matters further supports the fee request. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 95 F. Supp.2d 290, 323 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“In addition to noting the vast amount of work which was required in prosecuting this case, we also note Class Counsels’ representation that their involvement in this litigation required them to abstain from working on other matters.”). Hence, this factor weighs in favor of the requested fee. Co-Lead Counsel request the Court’s authorization to distribute the fees in a manner which, in the judgment of Co-Lead Counsel, fairly compensates each firm for its contribution to the prosecution of Plaintiffs’ claims. “Courts generally approve joint fee applications which request a single aggregate fee award with allocations to specific firms to be determined by Co- Lead Counsel, who are most familiar with the work done by each firm and each firm's overall                                                             9 Co-Lead Counsel set forth criteria for the billing of time and expenses by all counsel for the Class. In accordance with these criteria, each of the Plaintiffs’ law firms submitted reports of time and expenses to Co-Lead Counsel. 10 Those expenses include, among other things, costs for experts, document management, travel, photocopying, overnight mail, process service fees, long distance telephone, electronic research, and contributions to the common expense litigation fund. Id. contribution to the litigation.” In re Auto. Refinishing Paint, MDL No. 1426, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *20. Co-Lead Counsel’s request is consistent with Case Management Order (“CMO”) No. 1 entered by the Court pursuant to which Co-Lead Counsel for the United States law claims “shall be responsible for coordinating and organizing plaintiffs in the conduct of this action” and shall “coordinate the filing of a joint fee petition by plaintiffs’ counsel and to allocate any fees awarded by the Court among plaintiffs’ counsel.” See ECF No. 54, CMO No. 1 at Awards in Similar Cases
The 33 1/3% fee requested is a reasonable amount that falls well within the range of amounts approved by courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in similar cases. Indeed, “courts within this Circuit have typically awarded attorneys’ fees of 30% to 35% of the recovery, plus expenses.” In re Ravisent Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 00-1014, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at *40 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2005). See also Bradburn Parent Teacher Store, Inc. v. 3M, 513 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (approving percentage of recovery of 35%, plus reimbursement of expenses); In re FAO, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 03-942 & 03-6596, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16577, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2005) (awarding fees of 30% and 33%); Godshall v. Franklin Mint Co., No. 01-CV-6539, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23976, at*18 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2004) (awarding a 33.3% fee and noting that “[t]he requested percentage is in line with percentages awarded in other cases”); In re Corel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 497-98 (E.D. Pa.                                                             11 See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 533 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming the District Court’s decision to permit attorneys’ fees to be divided according to the discretion of the co-chairs of the Executive Committee and declining to “deviate from the accepted practice of allowing counsel to apportion fees amongst themselves”); Prudential, 148 F.3d at 329 n.96 (“The court need not undertake the difficult task of assessing counsels’ relative contributions”); In re Linerboard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10532, at *54 (granting liaison counsel authority to apportion attorneys’ fees because liaison counsel was in the best position to “describe the weight and merit of each [counsel’s] contribution”) (internal quotations omitted); In re Automotive. Refinishing Paint, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *36-*37. 2003) (awarding counsel one-third of the settlement fund in addition to reimbursement of litigation expenses); In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 423, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (approving a fee request of one-third of the settlement fund plus nearly $1.8 million in expenses); Cullen, 197 F.R.D. at 150 (an “award of one-third of the settlement fund” for attorneys’ fees is consistent with fee awards by district courts in the Third Circuit); In re Greenwich Pharm. Sec. Lit., No. 92-3071, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5717, at *16-*17 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1995) (holding that “a fee award of 33.3 percent is in line with the fee awards approved Thus, this factor weighs in favor of the requested fee. The Value of Benefits Attributable to Plaintiffs’ Counsel
Plaintiffs’ Counsel's relevant experience allowed them to effectively and efficiently litigate this case. There can be no contention that the proposed settlements could be attributed to work done by other groups, such as government agencies. See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541. Although Plaintiffs' allegations, at least in part, are based on an EC investigation and decision implicating some of the defendants in the operation of European and global cartels, there was no cooperation among Plaintiffs’ Counsel and the EC investigative body in pursuing United States law claims against the defendants regarding the Fasteners market, as EC procedures prohibited Plaintiffs from receiving internal EC investigative materials. Furthermore, there was no parallel action by the U.S. Department of Justice that assisted Plaintiffs’ Counsel. Thus, this factor provides support for the proposed fee award.                                                             12 Furthermore, in the last three years, various district courts have approved one-third fees in at least eight direct purchaser antitrust actions. See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *23 (listing cases). Private Contingency Fee Arrangement
The Court must analyze "the percentage fee that would have been negotiated had the case been subject to a private contingent fee arrangement at the time counsel was retained." In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541. In several cases, courts within the Third Circuit have observed that "attorneys regularly contract for contingent fees between 30% and 40% with their clients in non- class commercial litigation." In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, No. 03-0085, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013, at *46 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005). See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 123 (D.N.J. 2012); In re Ikon, 194 F.R.D. at 194 (“plaintiffs’ counsel routinely negotiate agreements providing between thirty and forty percent of any recovery”); In re Merck & Co. Vytorin ERISA Litig., No. 08-285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, at *41-42 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2010) ("[T]he 33.33% fee award requested reflects commonly negotiated fees in the private marketplace."). Thus, the award requested is squarely within this range and should be Innovative Terms of Settlement
The three proposed settlement agreements contain terms that are relatively standard. Therefore, this factor neither weighs against nor in favor of the proposed fee request. See e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *26 (“In the absence of any innovative terms, this factor neither weighs in favor nor against the proposed fee request."); McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 329, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (same); In re Merck, Civ. A. No. 08-285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, at *42 (same). This factor is therefore A Lodestar Cross-Check Demonstrates That The Fee Is Reasonable
The reasonableness of the fee requested by Co-Lead Counsel is further confirmed by a lodestar cross-check. See Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 307 n.17 (“Consideration of multipliers used in comparable cases may be appropriate” to gauge the reasonableness of a percentage fee award.). The lodestar crosscheck "is performed by dividing the proposed fee award by the lodestar calculation, resulting in a lodestar multiplier." AT&T, 455 F.3d at 164. The “multiplier” endeavors "to account for the contingent nature or risk involved in a particular case," and may be adjusted "to account for particular circumstances, such as the quality of representation, the benefit obtained for the class, [and] the complexity and novelty of the issues presented." Id. at 164 n.4 (citations & quotations omitted). Given the risks of contingent litigation, multipliers of up to four are frequently awarded in common fund cases. See, e.g., Meijer Inc. v. 3M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56744, at *82 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006) (4.77 multiplier); Nichols, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7061, at *79 (3.15 multiplier); Ravisent, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at *43 (3.1 multiplier); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *30 (2.99 multiplier); Caracallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 256 (D.N.J. 2005) (2.83 multiplier); Automotive Refinishing Paint, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *35 (2.3 multiplier is “within an acceptable range”), Linerboard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10532, at *49 (2.66 multiplier); Rent-Way, 305 F. Supp. 2d As explained in more detail above, Counsel’s work has included, among other things, the investigation and filing of claims; briefing and arguing in opposition to motions to dismiss; briefing and arguing in opposition to a Section 1292(b) motion for interlocutory appeal; negotiating preliminary discovery and jurisdictional discovery; and negotiating the settlements, together with the briefing and argument related to requests for settlement approval. The firms involved charged reasonable amounts based on their reasonable historic billable rates and the individual attorneys or staff member working on an assignment. Rubin Decl. ¶ 11. The aggregate lodestar value of Counsel’s time litigating this matter is $8,540,668.80. See Rubin Decl. and Exhibits thereto. Based on this lodestar amount, Plaintiffs’ Counsel will receive a negative multiplier from the requested fee award. Thus, the requested fee of one-third
of the Settlement Fund, or $5.85 million, represents a negative multiplier of 0.68. Accordingly, the lodestar cross-check supports the reasonableness of the requested fee. See Automotive Refinishing Paint, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *18 (finding that requested fee percent was fair and reasonable “[s]ince the multiplier is less than 1 (a "negative lodestar") and the requested fee is less than the amount that would be awarded using the lodestar method.”). The Request For An Award Of Expenses Incurred Is Reasonable
Members of the Settlement Class were informed in the published and mailed Notice that Co-Lead Counsel would be seeking reimbursement of their expenses. Here, Plaintiffs’ Counsel have incurred expenses totaling $337,667.72 that have not been reimbursed. Rubin Decl., Exhibit B. These expenses were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this case, and included, among other things, costs for experts, document management, travel, photocopying, overnight mail, process service fees, long distance telephone, electronic research, and contributions to the common expense litigation fund. Id. Attorneys “who create a common fund for the benefit of a class are entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from the fund.” Nichols, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7061, at *79 (quoting In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1219, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68, at *40 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2001)); see also Meijer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56744, at *59 (granting plaintiffs’ motion for approval of expenses “incurred in connection with the prosecution and settlement of the litigation, and include costs related to the following: travel; computerized legal research; copying; postage; telephone and fax; transcripts; retention of a mediator; the document database; expert services; and claims administration.”); Corel, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (“There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to reimbursement of . . . reasonable litigation expenses from the fund.”) (quoting Ikon, 194 F.R.D. at 192); In re Unisys Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 99-5333, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20160, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2001). Because the expenses incurred in this case are reasonable and were necessary, Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request that the Court authorize their reimbursement. INCENTIVE AWARDS FOR THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES ARE
APPROPRIATE
Co-Lead Counsel also request incentive awards to the four Class Representatives in the amount of $5,000 each. Approving incentive awards is common in such cases, especially when the settlement establishes a common fund. See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 333 n.65; "The purpose of these payments is to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they incurred during the course of class action litigation, and to reward the public service of contributing to the enforcement of mandatory laws." Id. The Class Representatives also “launched this litigation despite the risk of retaliation inherent in suing a supplier.” In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *32. Throughout this litigation, the Class Representatives were often in communication with Co-Lead Counsel about the Fasteners industry, searched for and produced documents at the request of Co-Lead Counsel, and communicated with Co-Lead Counsel with respect to all filings. The awards requested are appropriate and should be awarded here due to the time, effort and risks undertaken by Fishman & Tobin, Inc., Greco Apparel, Inc., Jolna Apparel Group LLC, and Norman Shatz Co, U.S.A. as the Class Representatives. See Automotive Refinishing Paint, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569, at *23 (awarding incentive awards of $15,000 to each of the four Class Representatives for their service to the Class). CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Co-Lead Counsel respectfully request that the Court grant the request for an award of counsel fees, reimbursement of litigation expenses and the incentive awards to the four Class Representatives. [email protected] /s/ Gerald J. Rodos CO-LEAD COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS

Source: https://www.hefflerclaims.com/cases/FAS/Fasteners%20Fee%20Brief.pdf