Abbreviations: (GS = Gesammelte Schriften; SW = Sämtliche Werke)
1. Reinach Adolf. Über Den Ursachenbegriff Im Geltenden Strafrecht. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1905.
(SW pp. 1-43). "Psychology, Reinach argues, is capable of assisting in the clarification of the legal meaning of theconcept of cause via appeal to the notion of a psychic regularity. This same notion can help also in theclarification of the probable intent of specific laws. From the point of view of Reinach's laterphilosophy, the work may be seen as a study of the legal determinations [Bestimmungen] of positivelaw and of the development of aids for their practical interpretation. There is as yet however nosuggestion of his doctrine of the a priori structures underlying legal formations."Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 300.
2. ———. "William James Und Der Pragmatismus." Welt und Wissen.Hannoversche Blätter für Kunst,Literatur und Leben (1910). (SW pp. 45-50)
3. ———. "Die Obersten Regeln Der Vernunftschlüsse Bei Kant." Kant Studien 16 (1911): 214-233.
4. ———. "Kants Auffassung Des Humeschen Problems." Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophischeKritik 141 (1911): 176-209. (GS pp. 1-35; SW pp. 67-93)
5. ———. "Zur Theorie Des Negativen Urteils." In Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. FestschriftFür Theodor Lipps, edited by Pfänder, Alexander. 196-254. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1911. (GS pp. 56-116; SW pp. 95-140). Revised edition in: Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics, Vol. 0, no. 0,pp. 37-103, April 1999.
6. ———. "Die Apriorischen Grundlagen Des Bürgerlichen Rechtes." Jahrbuch für Philosophie undphänomenologische Forschung 1 (1913): 685-847. New edition with the title "Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Die apriorischen Grundlagen desbürgerlichen Rechts" and a preface by Anna Reinach, München, Kösel, 1953. (GS pp. 166-350; SW pp. 141-278)
7. ———. "Die Überlegung: Ihre Ethische Und Rechtliche Bedeutung." Zeitschrift für Philosophie undphilosophische Kritik (1913). First part Vol. 148 (1912) pp. 181-196; second part Vol. 149 (1913) pp. 30-58. (GS pp. 121-165; SW pp. 279-311)
8. ———. "Paul Natorps 'Allgemeine Psychologie Nach Kritischer Methode'." Göttingische gelehrteAnzeigen 4 (1914): 193-214. (GS pp. 351-376; SW pp. 313-331). "Natorp had claimed that the I can never be an object of consciousness and thus it cannot form part ofthe subject-matter of psychology. The latter is restricted to the contents of consciousness, i.e. to all ofthat of which one is conscious. Reinach argues that it is grounded in the essence of cogitationes thatthey can exist only as experiences of an I. Thus he defends the Cartesian view according to which thecogito is the starting poing of our knowing, and he insists that the I is present in each and everyexperience. However, the pure I - as distinct from the empirical person - is not a thing withcharacteristics; Natorp may therefore be correct in his view that it 'does not admit of any explanation'. But this does not rule out the clarification of the ways in which it interrelates with other elements inessential structures. In grasping itself the I is both bearer and end-point of a grasping act. Unlike Natorp, who insisted thateach relation must have two terms, Reinach sees no difficulty here, since intentionality is not a relationin the usual sense."Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 300-301.
9. ———. Gesammelte Schriften. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1921.
Edited from his students. With a preface by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (XXVI+461 ppages). (This edition is now superseded by Sämtliche Werke).
10. ———. "Über Das Wesen Der Bewegung." In Gesammelte Schriften. 406-461. Halle: Max Niemeyer,
1921. Prepared by Edith Stein fromseminar notes in Reinach's Nachlass. (SW pp. 551-588). "Contains an analysis of continuity and of the essence of traversing of space, the results of which arethen applied to Zeno's paradoxes. A motion is a continuous process, it should not be thought of as aseries of single part-processes somehow combined together. Reinach asserts that it is self-evident that all real motion requires a bearer, but denies that this impliesthat all perception of motion involves the perception of a bearer. I can speak of motion and intendmotion without at the same intending something that moves."Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 301.
11. ———. Was Ist Phänomenologie? München: Kõsel, 1951.
With a preface by Hedwig Conrad-MartiusLesson held at Marburg in 1914 with the title Über Phänomenologie and first published in GS pp. 379-405 (SW pp. 531-550).
12. ———. Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe in 2 Bänden. Mûnchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1989.
Critical edition by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith in two volumes. Band I. Die WerkeI. TeilKritische Neausgabe (1905-1914)Geleitwort von Eberhard Avé-Lallement XI; Vorwort der Herausgegeber XIV-XVIII;1. (1905) 1-43; 2. William James und der Pragmatismus (1910) 45-50; 3. Die obersten Regeln derVernunftschlüsse bei Kant (1911) 51-65; 4. Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems (1911) 67-93; 5. Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils (1911) 95-140; 6. Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichenRechtes (1913) 141-278; 7. Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung (1912/13) 279-311;8. Paul Natorps "Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode" (1914) 313-331;II. TeilNachgelassene Texte (1906-1917)9. Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik (1906) 335-337; 10. Wesen und Systematik des Urteils (1908) 339-345;11. Über impersonale Urteile (1908?) 347-350; 12. Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt(1910) 351-354; 13. Nichtsoziale und Soziale Akte (1911) 355-360; 14. Die Vieldeutigkeit desWesensbegriffs (1912) 361-363; 15. Über Dingfarbe und Dingfärbung (1913) 365-367; 16. Einleitung indie Philosophie (1913) 369-513; 17. Zum Begriff der Zahl (1913/1914) 515-529; Über Phänomenologie(1914) 531-550; Über das Wesen der Bewegung (1914) 551-588; Aufzeichnungen (1916/17): A. ZurPhänomenologie der Ahnungen 589-591; B. Notizen auf losen Zetteln 592-604; C. Bruchstück einerreligionsphilosophischen Ausführung 605-611. Band. II Kommentar und TextkritikEinleitung: Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) 613Zu Band I, I. TeilAllgemeine Vorbemerkung 629; Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht 631; William Jamesund der Pragmatismus 639; Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant 643; Kants Auffassungdes Humeschen Problems 649; Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils 657; Die apriorischen Grundlagendes bürgerlichen Rechtes 665; Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung 689; PaulNatorps "Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode" 697;Zu Band I, II. TeilDie Grundbegriffe der Ethik 705; Wesen und Systematik des Urteils 709; Über impersonale Urteile 719;Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt 725; Nichtsoziale und Soziale Akte 729; DieVieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs 733; Über Dingfarbe und Dingfärbung 737; Einleitung in diePhilosophie 741; Zum Begriff der Zahl 759; Über Phänomenologie 767; Über das Wesen der Bewegung775; Aufzeichnungen 787; Literaturverzeichnis 813; Sachverzeichnis 831; Personenverzeichnis 845.
13. ———. "Platons Philosophie [Vorlesung] Summer Semester 1910." In Josef Seifert. Ritornare aPlatone. La Fenomenologia Realista Come Riforma Critica Della Dottrina Platonica Delle Idee. InAppendice Un Testo Inedito Su Platone Di Adolf Reinach. 224-237. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2000. German text and Italian translation by Giuseppe Girgenti.
1. Reinach, Adolf. 1968. "What Is Phenomenology." The Philosophical Forum no. 1:231-256.
Translation and introduction by Derek Kelly. "Reinach's essay is a brief introduction to applied phenomenology. The first part of the essay isexegetical: Reinachexplains the philosophic limitations and problems of the sciences of psychology and
of mathematics, and discusses in particular the work of Hilbert and Kronecker. In the second part ofthe paper, Reinach develops ths concept of the 'a priori.' He rejects both the positivist conception ofsolely analytic 'a priori,' and also the Kantian notion of necessary conditions for thought. Reinachargues that the 'a priori' is legitimately seen not as subjective or as necessary for thought, but as anecessity of being."
2. ———. 1969. "Concerning Phenomenology." The Personalist no. 50:194-221.
Translation by Dallas Willard. "This paper attempts to illustrate how phenomenological research is done. For Reinach,phenomenology is an attitude or way of seeing, not a set of truths. It is the examination of essences, oruniversals, and their interconnections. Reinach discusses and illustrates how such examination isrequired in descriptive psychology, and how it is essentially dispensed with in mathematics, asunderstood by Hilbert. There follows a critique of Frege's view of number, and a phenomenologicalelucidation of the distinction between cardinal and ordinal numbers. Reinach's final remarks aredevoted to misinterpretations of the "a priori" and to its correct analysis."
3. ———. 1976. "Kant's Interpretation of Hume's Problem." In David Hume. Many-Sided Genius, edited
by Merrill, Kenneth and Shahan, Robert, 161-168. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Translated by Jitendra Nath Mohanty. Published also in: Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1976), pp. 161-188.
4. ———. 1981. "A Contribution toward the Theory of the Negative Judgement." Aletheia no. 2:15-64.
5. ———. 1982. "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment." In Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic andFormal Ontology, edited by Smith, Barry, 315-377. München: Philosophia Verlag. Translated by Barry Smith.
6. ———. 1983. "The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law." Aletheia no. 3:1-142.
7. ———. 1987. "William James and Pragmatism." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and theFoundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 291-298. Dordrecht: MartinusNijhoff. Translated by Barry Smith.
8. ———. 1994. "The Supreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant." Aletheia no. 6:81-97.
9. ———. 2013. The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law. Along with the Lecture, “ConcerningPhenomenology”. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Edited by John F. Crosby. With a Foreword by Alasdair MacIntyre. Translator of The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law: John F. Crosby. Translator of “Concerning Phenomenology”: Dallas Willard.
1. Reinach Adolf. I Fondamenti a Priori Del Diritto Civile. Milano: Giuffré, 1990.
Traduzione di Daniela Falcioni, presentazione di Bruno Romano.
2. ———. "Platons Philosophie [Vorlesung] Sommer Semester 1910 - La Filosofia Di Platone (Lezioni Del
Semestre Estivo 1910)." In Ritornare a Platone. La Fenomenologia Realista Come Riforma CriticaDella Dottrina Platonica Delle Idee, edited by Seifert, Josef. 224-237. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2000. Appendice al volume di Seifert. Appunti delle lezioni raccolti da Alexandre Koyré.
3. ———. La Visione Delle Idee. Macerata: Quodlibet, 2008.
A cura di Alessandro Besoli e Stefano Salice. Sommario: Introduzione di Stefano Besoli; Profilo della vita e delle opere; 1. William James e ilpragmatismo; 2. Le regole supreme delle inferenze razionali in Kant; 3. L'interpretazione kantiana delproblema di Hume; 4. Sulla teoria del giudizio negativo; 5. La riflessione: il suo significato etico egiuridico; 6. Sull'Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode di Paul Natorp; 7. Sullafenomenologia; Agganciarsi a un'anima. Il domandare e i vissuti sociali della coscienza in AdolfReinach di Alessandro Salice; Nota terminologica; Indice degli argomenti; Indice dei nomi.
1. Reinach, Adolf. 1996. "Théorie Du Jugement Négatif." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale:384-436.
Traduction et présentation de Marc B. de Launay.
2. ———. 2004. Les Fondements À Priori Du Droit Civil. Paris: Vrin.
3. ———. 2012. Phénoménologie Réaliste. Paris: Vrin.
Le présent volume est un recueil visant à rendre accessible aux lecteurs français le versant théorétiquede la pensée de Reinach et se compose à la fois de textes publiés et posthumes – présentés ici dans unordre thématique, et non chronologique. Traduit de l’allemand sous la direction de D. Pradelle, par J.-F. Courtine, M. de Launay, A. Dewalque,J. Farges, D. Pradelle, P.-J. Renaudie et D. Seron.
1. "Adolf Reinach: Philosophie Du Langage, Droit, Ontologie." 2005. Les Études Philosophiques.
Index: Jocelyn Benoist: Reinach: philosophie du langage, droit, ontologie (avant-propos) 1; PhilippMayrhofer: Réalisme et fondation chez Adolf Reinach 3; Jocelyn Benoist: Reinach et la visée (dasMeinen): décliner l'intentionalité 19; Ronan de Calan: Causalité et nécessité matérielle: Reinach lecteurde Hume 39; Bruno Ambroise: Le problème de l'ontologie des actes sociaux: Searle héritier deReinach? 55; Sandra Laugier: Actes de langage et états de choses: Austin et Reinach 73; JulienCantegreil: D'une voie phénoménologique en théorie du droit. Remarques sur le réalisme d'AdolfReinach 99-112.
2. Ales Bello, Angela. 2004. "The Controversy About the Existence of the World in Edmund Husserl's
Phenomenological School A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein." AnalectaHusserliana.The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research no. 79:97-116. "The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among someof Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of theworld and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particularand original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and thedifference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that canbe called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar position that to someextend combines the two attitudes."
3. Ambroise, Bruno. 2005. "Le Problème De L'ontologie Des Actes Sociaux: Searle Héritier De Reinach?"
Les Études Philosophiques:55-72.
4. Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberly. 2011. Doorway to the World of Essences. Adolf Reinach and the EarlyPhenomenological Movement. Düsseldorf: VDM Publishing.
5. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2005. "Reinach Et La Visée (Das Meinen): Décliner L'intentionalité." Les Études
6. Benoist, Jocelyn, and Kervégan, Jean-François, eds. 2008. Adolf Reinach, Entre Droit EtPhénoménologie. De L'ontologie Normative À La Théorie Du Droit. Paris: CNRS Éditions.
7. Brown, James. 1987. "Reinach on Representative Acts." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach andthe Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 119-131. Dordrecht: MartinusNijhoff Publishers. "Austin is certainly the founding father of speech act theory as we have known it in recent decades, andone reason why Reinach's views on social acts are worthy of attention is the extent of their anticipationof Austin's work and their contribution to the understanding of human communicative action. Motheris their bearing on the thesis that fundamental concepts of civil law are found, and not introduced, bypositive law. A further reason is that, apart from anticipating the work of others, Reinach explores akind of social act which appears to have been neglected by subsequent speech act theorists. I refer torepresentative acts, where one person acts for or on behalf of or in the name of another! I shall first tryto set out Reinach's views (sections 1 and 2), and then discuss some issues which they raise, inparticular that of sincerity (sections 3 and 4) then that of prior empowerment for representative acts(section 5)." (p. 119)
8. Burkhardt, Armin. 1986. Soziale Akte, Sprechakte Und Textillokutionen: A. ReinachsRechtsphilosophie Und Die Moderne Linguistik. Tübingen: Niemeyer. "A detailed comparison of Reinach on social acts with the accounts of Searle and Austin who arecriticized for committing the 'ontological fallacy': they find forces in utterances."Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 307.
9. ———. 1986. "Il Filosofo Del Diritto Adolf Reinach, Lo Sconosciuto Fondatore Della Teoria Degli Atti
Linguistici." Teoria.Rivista di Filosofia no. 6:45-62.
10. ———. 1987. "Verplflichtung Und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in Der Rechtphilosophie Adolf
Reinachs." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology,edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 155-174. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
11. Calan, Ronan de. 2005. "Causalité Et Nécessité Matérielle: Reinach Lecteur De Hume." Les Études
12. Cantegreil, Julien. 2005. "D'une Voie Phénoménologique En Théorie Du Droit. Remarques Sur Le
Réalisme D'adolf Reinach." Les Études Philosophiques:99-112. "Écartant les questions traditionnelles de savoir comment il s'est singularisé dans l'histoire de ladoctrine allemande du droit et les raisons qui font de lui l'un des précurseurs de la théorie des actes delangages, la présente étude évalue l'intérêt juridique de l'approche « intuitionniste » de Reinach. L'utilisation conjointe de sa définition de la promesse et des travaux de Jean-Louis Gardies devraientmontrer l'impasse théorique et le faible intérêt pratique de son intuitionnisme, et ce faisant contribuerà diriger les recherches phénoménologiques en théorie du droit vers les travaux du Husserl des Idéesdirectrices."
13. ———. 2006. "Adolf Reinach Théoricien Du Droit: Sur La Causalité." Archives de Philosophie du Droit
no. 49:401-416. "Bien qu'il ait été commenté par les plus illustres (Husserl, Kantorowicz, Radbruch, Villey.) et que l'onait récemment pris la mesure de son importance en philosophie, Reinach n'a toujours pas su trouver saplace en théorie du droit. Comprendre l'impasse théorique et le faible intérét pratique de son approcheintuitionniste avait seulement suggéré de rediriger les recherches phénoménologiques en droit vers lesoeuvres tardives de Husserl. La présente analyse propose de relire Reinach à partir d'un texte dejeunesse quasi inconnu, sa Dissertation de 1905 Sur le Concept de cause en droit pénal. Reinach yapparait alors non seulement un représentant exemplaire des contradictions du positivisme de la fin duXIXe siècle, mais aussi une aide précieuse pour conceptualiser la cause en droit. Précurseur en ce quiconcerne les actes de langages, Reinach l'est aussi en ce qui concerne le concept de causalité. Reinachthéoricien du droit gagne ainsi pertinence, profondeur et actualité.
14. Crosby, John. 1983. "Reinach's Discovery of the Social Acts." Aletheia no. 3:143-194.
Contents: 1. The significance of Reinach's monograph; 2. Reinach as phenomenologist; 3. Reinach'sdiscovery of the "social acts"; 4. Reinach in dialogue with the speech act philosophers: promising as asocial act; 5. Continuation of the dialogue between Reinach and the speech act philosophers: theuninventable essence of promising; 6. Towards developing and deepening Reinach's analysis of thesocial acts; Reinach and Wojtyla; Reinach and Husserl; 7. Reinach's apriori sphere of right and thenatural moral law; 8. Legal obligation and moral duty; 9. Some consequences of Reinach's discovery forpolitical, legal, and moral philosophy; conclusion of the dialogue with the speech act philosophers.
15. Davie, George. 1987. "Husserl and Reinach on Hume's "Treatise"." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt:Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 257-274. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. "In 1929 Husserl wrote that Hume's real greatness was still unrecognised in its most important aspect. Now I believe that the contribution to Hume studies by Husserl - as conveyed by Jean Laporte inFrance and Kemp Smith in Britain - and by his pupil Reinach, have gone a long way towards changingthis state of affairs, because of a new way of reading Hume's Treatise that they introduced. I first setout Husserl's early views on Hume and then turn to Reinach's paper on Hume, which builds on thiswork, but also goes a long way beyond it and isolates the most important aspect of Hume'sachievement." (p. 257)
16. De Vecchi, Francesca, ed. 2012. Eidetica Del Diritto E Ontologia Sociale. Il Realismo Di Adolf Reinach./ Eidetics of Law and Social Ontology. Adolf Reinach, the Realist. Milano: Mimesis.
17. DuBois, James. 1994. "An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's 'the Supreme Rules of Rational InferenceAccording to Kant'." Aletheia no. 6:70-80. "In 1911, the same year that he published his work On the theory of the negative judgment, AdolfReinach published two articles on Kant's philosophy: Kant's understanding of the humean problemand The supreme rules of rational inference according to Kant. More than mere historical studies,these articles extend Reinach's contribution to the fields of ontology and what might be broadlyconstrued as the field of logic."
18. ———. 1995. Judgment and Sachverhalt. An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's PhenomenologicalRealism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Introduction 1; 1. Judgments and states of affairs 7; 2. Negation andcorrespondence 47; 3. Insight and the a priori 77; 4. Logic and arithmetic 115; 5. The discovery of socialacts 129; 6. Reinach as phenomenologist 145; Bibliography 159; Index 167-168.
"The outline of our study is as follows. Chapter One explores Reinach's conception of the judgment in terms of a state of belief, an act ofassertion, and an ideal meaning-unit. We examine his understanding of states of affairs, the objectual-correlates to judgments of all kinds. We further investigate how it is that the mind becomes directedtowards states of affairs, and this involves us in a study of Reinach's understanding of the relationshipsbetween intentionality, presentation, and intuitive fullness. Particularly here we see Reinach'sindebtedness to Husserl. Towards the end of the chapter we consider briefly the concepts of evidenceand knowledge -- for a judgment cannot be considered rational unless it is somehow related toobjective being through evidence or direct knowledge. In Chapter Two, we examine Reinach's claim that negative states of affairs subsist or obtain just as dopositive states of affairs. Here a confrontation with Ingarden's ontological investigations is particularlyhelpful, and something of a compromise position is defended. Reinach's discussion of negationprovides us with the opportunity to better understand the nature of concepts and properties, and thepeculiar sort of existence espoused by these. Chisholm's view of negative properties and states of affairsis compared to Reinach's, and here too we argue for modifications of both views. In Chapter Three we examine how Reinach's ontology of states of affairs is seen to lie at the basis ofmost traditional epistemological distinctions. Thus, distinctions between states of affairs give rise to thedifferences between necessary and contingent, synthetic and analytic, and formal and materialjudgments. We investigate further why philosophical insight is possible with regard to the states ofaffairs grounded in some essences, but not others. At this point we turn to the work of Reinach'sstudent, Dietrich von Hildebrand, where he distinguishes between accidental essential unities, morphicessential unities, and necessary essential unities, only the last of which can be known through insight oressential intuition. We close the chapter with a defense of insight, and a discussion of its place inphilosophical argumentation. By the time we reach Chapter Four, we have already investigated the nature of many logically relevantconcepts, such as proposition, truth and falsity, implication, ontological modality, analycity andsyntheticity. However, it seems worthwhile to present Reinach's overall conception of logic, aconception which is at the same time classical and original. In connection with his work on logic wediscuss briefly Reinach's conception of numbers. Interestingly, Reinach rejects the existence of ordinalnumbers, and he argues that cardinal numbers cannot be predicated. As one might expect, hisexplanation of the ontological correlates to the truths of arithmetic involves a fascinating application ofhis philosophy of states of affairs. In Chapter Five we examine his "Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law". Particularly here we are forcedto prescind from many interesting and worthwhile ideas. Our interest in this work is restricted to hisdiscovery of social acts (better known today as speech acts), and in particular the nonasserting ornonjudging character of these acts. These acts are neither correct nor incorrect, for they are not"conforming" acts, or acts of "fit". They are rather "grounded" or "ungrounded" and "effective" or"ineffective". A confrontation of his analysis of promising with that of Searle allows us to test thesoundness of Reinach's ontology of essences and his recognition of synthetic a priori states of affairsand truths. Finally, we examine Reinach's claim that he has discovered a new sort of object: real,temporal objects, which are neither physical nor mental. In Chapter Six, our concluding chapter, we look at Reinach as a phenomenologist. By the time we reachthis last chapter, many will understand why we call Reinach a realist, but they will wonder whatcharacterizes him as a phenomenologist. We present a few key ideas from his lecture "ConcerningPhenomenology" and defend an interpretation of the phenomenological attitude as characterized aboveall by a rigorous fidelity to what is given. While we refuse to take up a confrontation of Reinach'sphenomenological realism with the motives for Husserl's transcendental idealism, we do briefly suggestsome philosophical reasons which make intelligible Reinach's unwillingness to espouse the "newdevelopments". We conclude the book by suggesting one sense in which Reinach's analysis of humanacts stands in need of a "subjective" grounding, though not of the sort Husserl suggests." (pp. 3-5).
19. ———. 2002. "Adolf Reinach's Contributions to Meta-Ethics and the Philosophy of Law." In ThePhenomenological Tradition in Moral Philosophy, edited by Embree, Lester and Drummond, John,327-346. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
20. Falcioni, Daniela. 1991. Le Regole Della Relazionalità: Una Interpretazione Della Fenomenologia DiAdolf Reinach. Milano: Giuffré Editore.
21. ———. 2002. "Immanuel Kant Und Adolf Reinach: Zwei Linien Des Widerstandes Im Vergleich."
Kant-Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft no. 93:351-370.
22. Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1987. "Adolf Reinach and the Analytic Foundations of Social Acts." In Speech Actand Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin,107-117. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. "One of the most interesting contributions to philosophy in Adolf Reinach's work The A PrioriFoundations of Civil Law is the analysis the author puts forward of what he generally calls social acts.
This analysis is extended to deal with such specific types of social acts as promises, orders, prayers,requests, communications (mitteilen), questions, the particulars of which are all gone into by Reinach. When, much later, Anglo-Saxon authors such as Austin and Searle discovered the quite specialcharacter of speech-acts it is almost certain that Reinach could have had no influence on them, for theyknew nothing of his work. Even if they had had some indirect acquaintance with the work it is by nomeans certain that they could have profited from its analyses. The intuitionist style that marks thework, which appeared in 1913 as part of the first large wave of the phenomenological movementremoves it almost totally from the purview of the analytic approach of the Anglo-Saxon tradition withinwhich the new theory of speech-acts was to find its natural home. Since the two philosophies use quitedifferent languages it would have been difficult to see that there was a shared subject matter and thatsome at least of the conclusions were the same." (p. 107)(.)"Reinach's merit is to have given superb demonstrations of the a priori character of the pure science oflaw. He has annihilated psychologism, sociologism andhistoricism in the legal sphere as surely as Fregehad annihilated them in the realm of mathematics. It remains to provide each of his remarkableanalyses with its theoretical explanation in order to establish that, in the last instance, the a priorijudgements whose existence at the basis of civil law he has revealed, are themselves analytic." (p. 117).
23. Habbel, Irmingard. 1959. Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in Der Phänomenologie Und Bei Thomas VonAquin. Regensburg: Josef Habbel.
24. Hillebrand, Dietrich von. 1955. "Die Rechtliche Und Sittliche Sphäre in Ihrem Eigenwert Und in Ihrem
Zusammenhang." In Die Menschheit Am Scheideweg. Gesammelte Abhandlungen Und Vorträge,86-106. Regensburg: Josef Habbel. Contains an exposition and development of Reinach's philosophy of law.
25. Hoffmann, Klaus. 1987. "Reinach and Searle in Promising. A Comparison." In Speech Act andSachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin,91-106. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. "If one is to believe Mephistopheles, even the devil seems to be bound to keep a promise and theexplanation of this state of affairs requires more than just a few words. In the twentieth century various well-known philosophers have gone into great detail in order to clearup the question why promises can give rise to obligations. The works of Adolf Reinach and John Searleare two outstanding examples of attempts to analyse promising. In what follows I shall compare theiraccounts as precisely as possible in order to provide arguments for and against the view that thefamous analysis by John Searle was already anticipated by Adolf Reinach in 1913. I begin with an examination of the relation between Reinach's (category of) social acts and Searle's(category of) speech acts in which I concentrate on the relations between entities and laws on the onehand and institutional facts and rules on the other. Finally, I scrutinize the different conception of`obligation' in the two accounts." (p. 91)
26. Hübener, Wolfgang. 1975. "Die Logik Der Negation Als Ontologisches Erkenntnismaterial." In
Positionen Der Negativität, edited by Weinrich, Harald, 105-140. Munich: Fink. "pp. 134f. is a discussion of reinach and Sigwart pn the locus of negation."Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 314.
27. Husserl, Edmund. 1975. "Adolf Reinach (in Memoriam)." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
no. 35:571-574. Originally published in Kantstudien, 23, 1919 pp. 147-149.
28. Ingarden, Roman. 1964. Der Streit Um Die Existenz Der Welt. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
"See esp. chapter XI of vol. II/1, Die Form des Sachverhalts. Sachverhalt und Gegenstand (includesextensive critique of Reinach Zur Theorie des Negativen Urteils) and § 62 of vol. II/2, which contains acriticism of Reinach on movement."Barry Smith, An Annotated Bibliography, p. 316.
29. Kujundzic, Nebojsa. 1997. "Reinach, Material Necessity, and Free Variation." Dialogue no. 36:721-739.
30. Künne, Wolfgang. 1987. "The Intentionality of Thinking: The Difference between State of Affairs and
Propositional Matter." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of RealistPhenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 175-187. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. "For Reinach as for Russell, the state of affairs called "the being snub-nosed of Socrates" contains as"objectual elements" (gegenstiindliche Elemente, gegenstandliche Glieder)37 a "real" as well as an"ideal object"," Socrates and the property of being snub-nosed. Reinach clearly recognizes, what someanalytical philosophers do not, that "states of affairs cannot be simply stuck together(zusammengestoppelt), as it were, out of arbitrary elements"? Only if somebody (rightly or wrongly)can judge or believe that a is P, is there such a thing as the (obtaining or not obtaining) state of affairs,the being P of a (See § 3 above).
Reflecting on attributes like possibility and necessity, Reinach stresses "that it is . states of affairs andonly states of affairs, which can adopt such modalities". I shall try now to clarify the relevance of thisReinachian observation in the final section of this paper." (p. 185 - notes omitted).
31. Laugier, Sandra. 2005. "Actes De Langage Et États De Choses: Austin Et Reinach." Les Études
32. Lohmar, Dieter. 1992. "Beiträge Zu Einer Phänomenologischen Theorie Des Negativen Urteils."
Husserl Studies no. 8:173-204.
33. Mayrhofer, Philipp. 2005. "Réalisme Et Fondation Chez Adolf Reinach." Les Études
34. Mulligan, Kevin, ed. 1987. Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of RealistPhenomenology. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations employed in the text XIII; Adolf Reinach: an intellectualbiography by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith 3; Promisings and other social acts: their constituentsand structure by Kevin Mulligan 29; Reinach and Searle on promising. A comparison by KlausHoffmann 91; Adolf Reinach and the analytic foundations of social acts by Jean-Louis Gardies 107;Reinach on representative acts by James Brown 119; Demystifying Reinach's legal theory by Stanley L. Paulson 133; Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtphilosophie AdolfReinachs by Armin Burkhardt 155; The intentionality of thinking: the difference between State ofAffairs and Propositional Matter by Wolfgang Künne 175; On the cognition of Sates of Affairs by BarrySmith 189; Johannes Daubert Kritik der "Theorie des negativen Urteils" von Adolf Reinach by KarlSchuhmann 227; Husserl und Reinach by Karl Schuhmann 239; Husserl and Reinach on Hume's"Treatise" 257; Adolf Reinachs Vortrag über die Grundbegriffe der Ethik by Karl Schuhmann 275;William James and Pragmatism by Adolf Reinach 291; Adolf Reinach: an annotated bibliography byBarry Smith 299-332; Index 333-344. From the Preface: "Phenomenology as practised by Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) in his all too briefphilosophical career exemplifies all the virtues of Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is sober,concerned to be clear and deals with specific problems. It is therefore understandable that, in aphilosophical climate in which Husserl's masterpiece has come to be regarded as a mere stepping stoneon the way to his later Phenomenology, or even to the writings of a Heidegger, Reinach's contributionsto exact philosophy have been all but totally forgotten. The topics on which Reinach wrote mostilluminatingly, speech acts (which he called 'social acts') and states of affairs (Sachverhalte), as well ashis realism about the external world, have come to be regarded as the preserve of other traditions ofexact philosophy. Like my fellow-contributors, I hope that the present volume will go some waytowards correcting this unfortunate historical accident. Reinach's account of judgements and states of affairs, an account that precedes those of Russell andWittgenstein, his 1913 treatment of speech acts, his reinterpretation of Hume and aspects of his legalphilosophy are the main philosophical topics dealt with in what follows. But his analysis of deliberationas well as his work on movement and Zeno's paradoxes get only a passing mention."
35. ———. 1987. "Promising and Other Social Acts: Their Constituents and Structure." In Speech Act andSachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin,29-90. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. "The discovery of what Reinach called social acts (in 1913) and Austin speech acts (in 1962) was firstand foremost the discovery of a type of linguistic action which, Reinach and Austin are convinced, hadsimply not been noticed hitherto. It is true that both authors present their discovery within atheoretical framework and that they hoped that their accounts of the phenomenon discovered would betaken as representative of new ways of doing philosophy. It is also true that there are great differencesbetween the frameworks and the hopes of the two philosophers. But both are emphatic that theirprimary objective is to bring into focus, and fully describe, a phenomenon of which promising is theirfavourite example. Other social acts dealt with in some detail by Reinach are requesting, questioning,ordering, imparting information, accepting a promise and legal enactment, which - except for the lasttwo - are all at least touched on by Austin. (*)" (p. 29)(*) Reinach's theory is set out in his monograph The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law, in particularin § 2 Claim and Obligation, § 3 The Social Acts, § 4 The Act of Promising as the Origin of Claim andObligation, § 7 Representation, § 8 Enactments and the Propositions which Express Enactments.
36. Paulson, Stanley L. 1987. "Demystifying Reinach's Legal Theory." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt:Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 133-154. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
37. Salice, Alessandro. 2009. Urteile Und Sachverhalte. Ein Vergleich Zwischen Alexius Meinong UndAdolf Reinach. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. "The judgment constitutes a fundamental notion for several disciplines such as descriptive psychology,
ontology and logic, and hence its investigation represents a pivotal area of research within theoreticalphilosophy. Inside the Brentano-School, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Adolf Reinach (1883-1917)made significant contributions to this topic, separating and exploring both the subjective side ofjudgment (the intentional experience of judging) as well as its objective side (the “state of affairs” or the“objective”). In this publication Meinong’s and Reinach’s lore regarding the psychological and object-theoretical aspects of judgment are explicated, compared and evaluated."
38. Schuhmann, Karl. 1987. "Johannes Dauberts Kritik Der "Theorie Des Negativen Urteils"." In SpeechAct and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan,Kevin, 227-238. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
39. ———. 1987. "Hussserl Und Reinach." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations ofRealist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 239-256. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
40. ———. 1987. "Adolf Reinachs Vortrag Über Die Grundbegriffe Der Ethik." In Speech Act andSachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin,275-289. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
41. ———. 1990. "Elements of Speech Act Theory in the Work of Thomas Reid." History of PhilosophyQuarterly no. 7:47-66. "The account of social acts sketched by Thomas Reid is shown to constitute an anticipation of thetheory of speech acts standardly associated with Austin and Searle. Reid's ideas are compared also withthat other (and in many ways more important) pre-Austinian speech act theory worked out by thephenomenologist Adolf Reinach in his monograph on the act of promising of 1913."
42. ———. 1993. "Edith Stein Und Adolf Reinach." In Studien Zur Philosophie Von EdithStein.Internationales Edith Stein-Symposion Eichstätt 1991, edited by Fetz Reto, Luzius, Rath,Matthias and Schulz, Peter, 53-88. München: K. Alber. Reprinted in: K. Schuhmann - Selected papers on phenomenology - Dordrecht, Springer, , 2004, pp. 163-184
43. Seifert, Josef. 1983. "Is Reinach's "Apriorische Rechtslehre" More Important for Positive Law Than
Reinach Himself Thinks." Aletheia no. 3:197-230.
44. ———. 1992. "Die Philosophie Adolf Reinachs: Bemerkungen Anl?Sslich Der Veroffentlichung Einer
Neuen Kritischen Ausgabe Der Schriften Reinachs." Aletheia.An International Yearbook of Philosophyno. 5:432-438.
45. Smith, Barry. 1978. "An Essay in Formal Ontology." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 6:39-62.
"On the controversy between Reinach and Ingarden concerning negative states of affairs."Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 328.
46. ———. 1978. "Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy." In Wittgenstein and HisImpact on Contemporary Thought. Proceedings of the Second International WittgensteinSymposium, 31-35. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. "On early Sachverhalt ontologies."
47. ———. 1978. "Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought." Inquiry.An InterdisciplinaryJournal of Philosophy no. 21:425-441. "The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein'searly thought in the light of twentieth-century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories ofthe phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as restingon ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the Tractatus: in each case it is actual andpossible Sachverhalte which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationshipbetween the States of Affairs depicted, e.g., in the sentences of a legal trial and prior fact-complexes towhich these may correspond suggests one possible connecting link between the logical and ontologicalsections of the Tractatus and the ethical reflections appearing at the end. It is argued that the latter canbest be understood in terms of the idea of a "Last judgment" (with its associated ethical rewards andpunishments) which would relate to the world as a whole as a penal trial relates to individualcomplexes of facts."
48. ———. 1982. "Introduction to Adolf Reinach 'on the Theory of Negative Judgment'." In Parts andMoments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, edited by Smith, Barry, 289-314. München:Philosophia Verlag.
49. ———. 1987. "On the Cognition of State of Affairs." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and theFoundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 189-225. Dordrecht: MartinusNijhoff Publishers.
50. ———. 1987. "Adolf Reinach: An Annotated Bibliography." In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinachand the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 299-332. Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. "When the present volume was first conceived, it was confidently believed that a survey of the literatureon Reinach's thought could be kept within comfortable limits. It rapidly became clear, however, thatthis was not the case. Reinach's discoveries in the sphere of speech act theory have, it is true, gonealmost unnoticed. Reinach has nevertheless enjoyed an enduring notoriety among those working in thephilosophy of law, and ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on "Die apriorischenGrundlagen des burgerlichen Rechtes" has served as the principal representative of phenomenological,aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches in this discipline. His name accordingly appears in themajority of the more substantial general treatises in the discipline (or at least in those treatises andreference works published in countries whose law and philosophy have been influenced by theGermanic tradition: Edwards' great Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not contain even a mention ofReinach). The goal of completeness has therefore been abandoned in what follows, and items containing merelypassing references to Reinach's work have been listed only where they are of particular historicalimportance or bear evidence of some more substantial influence. The list has been compiled with theassistance of N. Bokhove, A.G. Conte and M.-E. Conte, J. Crosby, N. Duxbury, J. Joerden, S. Paulson,H. Spiegelberg and the indefatigable librarians of the University of Erlangen."
51. ———. 1989. "Logic and the Sachverhalt." The Monist no. 72:52-69.
"Logic is often conceived as a science of propositions, or of relations between propositions. There is analternativeview, however, defended by Meinong, Pfänder, Reinach and others, which sees logic as ascience of Sachverhalte or States of Affairs. A consideration of this view, which was defended especiallyby thinkers within the tradition of Brentano, throws new light on the problems of intentionality and ofmental content. It throws light also on the development of logic in Poland. Here the influence ofBrentano's student Kasimir Twardowski is especially important, and the paper concludes with a newinterpretation of Tarski's work on truth against the background of Twardowski's thinking."
52. ———. 1993. "An Essay on Material Necessity." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 18:301-322.
53. Smith, Barry, and Schuhmann, Karl. 1987. "Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography." In Speech Actand Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, edited by Mulligan, Kevin,1-27. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
54. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction.
Third revised edition (First edition 1960). About Reinach see pp. 191-200.
55. Stella, Giuliana. 1986. "L' "a Priori" Della Promessa in Adolf Reinach." Rivista Internazionale diFilosofia del Diritto no. 63:392-408.
56. Zelaniec, Wojciech. 1992. "Fathers, Kings, and Promises: Husserl and Reinach on the a Priori." HusserlStudies no. 9:147-177. "The author examines several examples (given by Husserl and his pupil, Adolf Reinach, and pertainingmainly to the social sphere) of allegedly analytic and synthetic a priori propositions. In a detailed line ofargument -- drawing among others on the theory of speech acts -- the author shows difficulties withclassifying some of those examples as analytic."
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